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Abstract
Using game theory, this study analyzed clients’ decisions after receiving digital relational 
marketing campaigns via email for two types of  products: apparel and electronics-music-video. 
The objectives were to analyze the promotional and relational e-mails to discern which of  the 
two is most effective in achieving marketing objectives and short-term business objectives. A 
cross-sectional study was carried out, with samples from Spain and Colombia, starting from a 
total of  400 surveys, a game based on the Nash Theory was proposed, having as a more 
important result, regardless of  the type of  email received by the client, the last action of  the 
client will be marked as “spam”. Likewise, differences were found by country and by gender 
depending on the type of  product and no conclusive differences were found on which type of  
communication (promotional or differential) is better received by the client.
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1. Introduction
Unconventional marketing, called direct marketing, has been very important over the last 
decade because it allows for personalizing marketing actions towards the client, building a 
long-term relationship between brand and consumer (Jonker, Piersma & Potharst, 2006). 
Nevertheless, on the internet, the traditional physical strategies of  advertising cannot be 
applied as the behavior of  the consumer on the internet may differ (Mahajan & Venkatesh, 
2000). New virtual actions are required such as promotional mechanisms including: e-mail 
display advertisements and social media (Kannan & Li, 2016; Bruce, Murthi & Rao, 2017; 
García, 2015).
The use of  e-mail as a direct marketing tool is an attractive choice for companies, when 
they have a database of  their potential customers as it allows them to have direct 
communication with the customer at a low cost and with high rates of  return (Jackson & 
DeCormier, 1999). E-mail advertising has a very low budget (De Haan, Wiesel & Pauwels, 
2016). E-mail spending represented only 1% of  the budget allotted for advertising in 
Europe, with 1 euro spent for every 2,500 e-mails sent (De Haan et al., 2016).
E-mail marketing can entail different actions, promotions, information and services, viral 
marketing, personalized e-mail and customer relation management (CRM) (Golbeck & 
Hendler, 2004). These can be grouped into two types of  mailings: 1) promotional 
character and 2) engagement character (MacLuhan, 2002). The promotional information 
mailing seeks to promote advertising discounts on the sale price of  one or several 
products with a limited period for their use. Engagement mailing is based on the previous 
experience of  the client and seeks to consolidate the relationship between customer and 
brand in a long lasting way (Gázquez Abad & De Cannière, 2010). In addition to studies 
on the optimal frequency of  mailing, or aspects that generate greater impact on the client 
(Jonker et al., 2006).
Another line of  research has focused on data mining as a key element for this type of  
marketing (Bell, Ledolter & Swersey, 2006). This is supported by Jonker et al. (2006), who 
found the use of  specialized programs and tests causes higher response rates, lower costs 
and higher profits. With the emergence of  the internet and e-mails, a new direct marketing 
channel has been created called e-mailing and mobile mailing (Chittenden & Rettie, 2003).
Thomas, Feng and Krishnan (2015) analyzed the case of  mailing in the acquisition and 
retention of  donors to ONG’s, finding that different emails must be sent depending on the 
action that is required and that these will cause different effects depending on the 
characteristics of  the donor. However, according to Gázquez Abad and De Cannière (2010), 
there are few studies that analyze the effect of  the business activities of  personalized mailing 
on the customer’s purchase behavior, or the consumer’s response to the types of  mailing 
(promotional and relational). Finally, there is little research on the new forms of  digital 
relational marketing, highlighting the need to analyze the customer’s buying responses to 
e-mailing.
Considering this gap in the literature, this article presents an empirical study that contributes to 
the knowledge within relational marketing, analyzing the behavior of  the client with respect to 
the type of  e-mails sent (promotional and relational). In particular, this paper aims to: 1) 
analyze the immediate effect of  the activities of  personalized e-mailing on the behavior of  the 
electronic consumer, for two products with different characteristics (clothing/textiles and 












Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VII. Issue 1. Pages 2-18. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
What Kind of E-Mail Information Is More Effective in Communicating with the Client? Application of Game...
differential e-mailing with the purpose of  determining which of  the two is more effective in 
achieving the objectives of  digital marketing (visit to the website, acceptance of  the 
information and purchase); and 3) to establish which of  the two e-mails encourages the 
achievement of  short-term commercial objectives.
Finally, and to achieve a larger analysis, this article presents an empirical cross-study between 
two countries (Spain and Colombia), in which we intend to discern different reactions to the 
communication strategy, depending on the cultural differences between the two countries, as 
well as the possible differences between gender.
This study uses a mathematical analysis, drawing on the theory of  Nash, as a tool for 
analyzing the efficiency of  information that must be sent by e-mail to customers as an action 
to boost sales. Analyzing from the calculation of  the “payments” the existence of  strict 
dominations, weak dominations and strategies (Mailath, 1998). We seek to determine the 
best strategies that must be established in the use of  this commercial communication 
channel.
2. Review of the Literature
2.1. Direct Marketing Route E-Mail
According to Chittenden and Rettie (2003), e-mail marketing must generate three actions in the 
client: 1) the client must be able to open the e-mail, 2) the e-mail must keep the customer’s 
interest in the information sent, and 3) persuade the customer to respond positively to the 
action of  the e-mail. Therefore, the words in the e-mail header that are displayed in the client’s 
inbox, the content of  the e-mail and the characteristics of  the recipient influence the 
effectiveness of  the e-mail.
It is important in e-mailing campaigns to have a defined database of  customers, as this shapes 
whether the information that is sent will be well received or on the contrary will be taken by 
the recipient as non-utilitarian, annoying information known as “spam” (Abrahams, Chaudhary 
& Deane, 2010; Chittenden & Rettie, 2003). It is therefore referred to as “Trust Mail” to 
messages that pass automatic filtering of  e-mail servers and which present reputation 
characteristics to the client (Golbeck & Hendler, 2004).
According to Chittenden and Rettie (2003), the following steps should be considered for an 
optimal e-mail marketing campaign:
• The design should be planned based on the strategy that the campaign should be used, 
Categories (geographical, purchase pattern, a.o.), also, the type of  information to send, 
plain text or HTML formats, images, videos, a.o., and finally, database of  potential 
customers, data mining is necessary to determine the characteristics of  the consumer and 
from this establish different contents, messages, periodicity, shipping schedule, a.o., 
according to the interests of  the established marketing campaign (García, 2015; Jonker et 
al., 2006).
• The production function, where the entire technological system of  communication mail, 
platforms, automation of  shipments and responses is built.
• The test function, it is necessary to do pilot tests with all the segments to see the answer 
according to its characteristics (gender, age, a.o.).
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• The deployment function, it is required to manage all the responses that integrates e-mailing, 
complaints, suggestions, unsubscribe requests, and positioning to Trust mails.
• Tracking function, gathering important information related to marketing objectives and 
measuring the effectiveness of  the campaign.
• Finally the function of  analysis and reporting, with the information collected generate analyzes 
and reports on the campaigns to optimize the relationship with the client (MacLuhan, 2002).
Ellis-Chadwick & Doherty (2012) conducted a research to different companies that use 
e-mailing, they was found among the most important aspects for a mailing campaign the 
following:
• Frequency and time of  sending, this includes also define hours and days of  sending mails.
• The “Subject line” should clearly define the initial content that will appear in the customer’s 
inbox, so two components must be taken into account: the “e-mail sender” identified as a reliable 
sender, usually Include the institutional name of  the company and the “subject matter” should 
use appealing words, that is, offer an incentive in the “Subject line”.
• “Headline” must be distinctive and motivate the customer to continue reading the entire e-mail.
• The extension of  the e-mail, if  it only contains alphanumeric information or also images, 
video or sound.
• Hyperlinks should be the least possible so that the client does not feel overwhelmed or lost 
browsing in them.
• Include interactive functions, that is, providing instant actions to customers to perform such 
as: customer service, store locators and places, or frequently asked questions.
• Animation, online advertising allows for using animated effects to capture the attention of  
the receiver.
• And finally personalization, although it is difficult to be able to address the customer by its 
name or another type of  distinctive of  its own.
Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:
• H1: e-mailing campaigns that contain a subject line focused on promotional marketing will 
have better results than e-mailing campaigns that contain a subject line focused on relational 
marketing.
• H2: The gender of  the client will influence the effectiveness of  the e-mailing campaign.
• H3: The cultural characteristics of  the client will influence the effectiveness of  the e-mailing 
campaign.
2.2. Game Theory
Game theory studies human behavior in conflict situations; it is a research method for strategic 
situations of  interaction between people and/or companies, economic actors have different 
behaviors in the market, which have different consequences for each player, depending on the 
strategies taken by all players (Mailath, 1998).
Game theory  
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The Nash model can be used by a company to determine the behavior of  agents such as 
customers, competitors, government, a.o., in strategic decisions making; each company has a 
combination of  strategies and knows that the other player will respond with other strategies. 
The Nash equilibrium is reached when the best “rewards” are obtained after the game occurs 
(Pepall, Richards & Norman, 2006).
Although there are few studies on the relationship between buyers and sellers, only Neslin and 
Greenhalgh (1983) have proposed an experiment on bargaining power relations using Nash’s 
theory to prove it.
3. Methodology
First, we describe the mathematical model to be used, constructing the game proposed for the 
case study, defining the players, strategies and possible payments. Then the empirical work, 
which includes the construction of  the questionnaire, the data collection, and finally the result 
of  the payments generated as proposed in the model are described.
3.1. Finite Game – Pure Strategies
Given a strategic game in which the players are represented by J1 and J2, the sets of  strategies 
for each player are S1 and S2 respectively and the payment functions of  each player are:
u1: S1 × S2      →      R              u2: S1 × S2      →      R    y
 (s1,s2) → u1 (s1,s2) (s1,s2) → u2 (s1,s2)
Given two strategies s’i and s’’i of  player Ji, we say that s’i strictly dominates s’’i “when for any 
strategy sk of  the other player Jk it is true that player Ji earns more strictly with s’i that with s’’i, 
that is: ∀sk ∈ Sk, ui (s’i, sk) > ui (s’’i, sk).
In a game in which each player has a strictly dominant strategy, the solution of  the game is 
clear, since each player will continue with the dominant strategy. Because a rational player will 
never choose a strictly dominant strategy, we can seek the solution to a game by iteratively 
eliminating dominant strategies.
We say that strategy s’i dominates weakly to strategy s’’i “when for any strategy sk of  another 
player Jk it is fulfilled that the player Ji wins more or equal with s’i that with s’’i, and the strict 
inequality is reached at least for a player strategy and J2 that is: ∀sk ∈ Sk, ui (s’i, sk) ≥ ui (s’’i, sk) y 
∃sk ∈ Sk, ui (s’i, sk) > ui (s’’i, sk).
In a game whose players are represented by J1 and J2, the sets of  strategies by S1 and S2 
respectively and in which the payment functions of  each player are: u1 and u2, the strategic 
combination (s*1, s*2) is a Nash equilibrium if  the following is true: ∀s1 ∈ S1u1 (s*1, s*2) ≥ ui (s1, 
s*2) y ∀s2 ∈ S2, ui (s*1, s*2) ≥ u2 (s*1, s*2).
In other words, s*1 is a solution of  the optimization problem maxs1 ∈ S1 {ui (s1, s*2)} and s*1 is a 
solution of  the optimization problem maxs2 ∈ S2 {u2 (s*1, s2)}.
3.2. Description of the Problem
Player J1: company that sends e-mail to potential clients.
Player J2: recipient of  the e-mail sent by the company.
The Nash model 
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Player 1 shares (G1):
• (OD) offer a discount in the sent e-mail.
• (ND) Do not offer a discount in the e-mail and simply to display information.
Player 2 shares (G2) (We will distinguish the gender of  the second player):
• (NOW) Do not open the e-mail, but do not unsubscribe the reception of  new e-mails.
• (ONF) Open the mail, do not click on the link to the company website, but do not 
unsubscribe the reception of  new mails.
• (OGW) Open the mail and click on the link.
• (NOS) Do not open the mail, do not click on the link to the company website and 
unsubscribe the receipt of  new emails, marking the email as spam.
3.3. Evaluation of the “Payments” to the Company
The evaluation of  payments to the company must be made considering the actions carried 
out by a certain number of  individuals of  the same sex. However, we must also consider a 
factor that introduces the “positivity” or “negativity” of  the payment. Thus, if  for 
example: 60% of  the recipients of  the e-mail decide not to open the link and to 
unsubscribe from the mail distribution list (ONF) and instead 30% of  the recipients of  
the e-mail click the link (OGW), then, it would not be correct to take as payment to the 
company the value 0’6 corresponding to 60% (ONF), and give as payment to the 
company the value 0’3 corresponding to 30% (OGW). This would mean a better payment 
to the company when the situation is worse. These situations could be solved by 
introducing negativity in cases that actually present an undesirable situation for the 
company.
If  we raise the problem with two players, on the one hand the player G1 which is the 
company and on the other hand a client receiver of  the mail, G2, the matrix of  the game 
with the payments to the company we will consider (Table 1).
Table 1
Matrix payment to the company
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) .0 .0’5 .1 -.1
(ND) .0 -0’5 .1 -.1
In which there would be no differences, in reference to the payments for the company, if  the 
mail contains discounts or if  it does not contain them. This situation changes when the mail 
stops being sent to a single possible client and is sent to a set of  possible clients.
In this study, we hypothesize that when mail is sent to a set of  potential customers (real 
situation, since it is meaningless for a single potential customer), we must open the door to 
the possibility that although a specific strategy may be more favorable to the company if  the 
mail is sent to a single potential customer, when the mail is sent to multiple recipients, it can 
generate different responses. 
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we hypothesize 
that when mail 
is sent to a set 
of  potential 
customers (real 
situation, since 
it is meaningless 
for a single 
potential 
customer),  
we must open 
the door to  
the possibility 
that although a 
specific strategy 
may be more 
favorable to the 
company
8
Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VII. Issue 1. Pages 2-18. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
What Kind of E-Mail Information Is More Effective in Communicating with the Client? Application of Game...
Suppose the company sends the email without offering a discount to a number (N) of  possible 
customers. We represent this in the following:
• N1 is the number of  mail recipients that do not open e-mail (NOW).
• N2 is the number of  recipients that open the e-mail, do not click the link and do not 
unsubscribe the reception of  new e-mails (ONF).
• N3 is the number of  mail receivers that open the e-mail and click the link (OGW).
• N4 is the number of  recipients that do not open the mail, do not click the link and 
unsubscribe to receive new mails (NOS).
Is fulfilled N1+ N2 + N3 + N4 = N.
We define the function U1 of  payments to player J1 in the case of  N possible clients, when the 
company does not offer discounts as follows:
U1 (OD, NOW) = 0* N1/N
U1 (OD,ONF) = .0’5* N2/N
U1 (OD,OGW) = 1* N3/N
U1 (OD;ONF) = -1* N4/N
Next, suppose the company sends the email offering a discount to M number of  potential 
customers. We represent this as follows:
• M1 is the number of  mail receivers that do not open the e-mail (NOW).
• M2 is the number of  receivers that open the e-mail, do not click the link and do not 
unsubscribe the reception of  new e-mails (ONF).
• M3 is the number of  mail receivers that open the e-mail and click the link (OGW).
• M4 is the number of  receivers that do not open the e-mail, do not click the link and 
unsubscribe to receive new mails (NOS).
Is fulfills: M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 = M.
The U2 function of  payments to player J1 in the case of  M possible clients, when the company 
offers discounts would be:
U1 (ND, NOW) = 0* M1/M
U1 (ND,ONF) = .0’5* M2/M
U1 (ND,OGW) = 1* M3/M
U1 (ND,NOS) = -1* M4/M
Note that the N and M values do not have to coincide, but the definition is based on a situation 
of  proportionality, which allows us to make comparisons between both situations. Also note 
that it is expected that the reaction of  potential customers if  offered a discount or if  no such 
discount is offered, are different.
The reaction  
of  potential 
customers  
if  offered  
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or if  no such 
discount  
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are different
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Example 1
Suppose the company sends hundred men an e-mail offering a discount and imagine that we 
have obtained the following response:
• 25 people have not opened the e-mail (NOW).
• 35 people open the e-mail, do not click the link and do not unsubscribe the reception of  
new mails (NGOs).
• 30 people open the e-mail and click the link (OGW).
• 10 people open the e-mail, do not click the link and unsubscribe the reception of  new 
e-mails (NOS).
For this, the matrix of  the game in which we only show the payments to the company in the 
table 2.
Table 2
Matrix payments to the company
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) 0*25/10.0 .0’5*35/10.0 1*30/100 -1*10/100
(ND)
Understanding that in the case where the company sent an e-mail without offering a discount, 
the possible actions by the receiver would be the same as the payments to the company, but 
this would change the values obtained in the sample. We could assume that when the company 
sends hundred and fifty men an email without offering a discount, we have obtained the 
following responses:
• 30 people have not opened the e-mail (NOW).
• 50 people open the e-mail, do not click the link and do not unsubscribe the receipt of  new 
mails (ONF).
• 45 people open the e-mail and click the link (OGW).
• 25 people open the e-mail, do not click the link and unsubscribe the reception of  new emails 
(NOS).
This would complete the payments to the company as follow matrix (Table 3).
Table 3
Matrix payments to the company
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0*25/10.0?) (.0’5*35/10.0?) (1*30/10.0?) (-1*10/10.0?)
(ND) (0*30/150 ,?) (.0’5*50/15.0?) (1*45/15.0?) (-1*25/15.0?)
Namely the table in which the payments have not been included to the recipient of  the e-mail, 




the client using 
the theory of  
the opportunity 
cost, assigning  
a positive value 
to the client 
when he or she 
accepts and 
opens the mail 
and a negative 
value when he 
or she does not
10
Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VII. Issue 1. Pages 2-18. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
What Kind of E-Mail Information Is More Effective in Communicating with the Client? Application of Game...
Table 4
Matrix payments to the company
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0 ,?) (0’175,?) (0’3,?) (-0’.1 ?)
(ND) (0 ,?) (0’167,?) (0’3,?) (-0’167,?)
3.4. Valuation of Payments to the Possible Client
The valuation of  the payments to the potential customer cannot depend on the number of  
clients that have chosen a particular action (unless the company imposes a limited number of  
discounts). We refer, for example, to when we talk about the payment that the possible client 
receives, it is indifferent if  55% of  the receivers of  the mail does not open the mail, or if  it is 
65% that they do not open it.
We will determine the “payments” to the client using the theory of  the opportunity cost, 
assigning a positive value to the client when he or she accepts and opens the mail and a 
negative value when he or she does not. In addition, taking into account someone opening the 
mail but preventing new offers entails the loss of  opportunities to obtain new discounts, we 
should penalize this situation compared to simply not opening the mail.
We define the utility function U2 of  payments to player G2, which as mentioned, does not depend 
on the number of  recipients of  the mail, when the mail offers a discount, taking into account:
• If  the prospective client does not open (NOW), he or she loses the opportunity cost, but 
does not close the door to future opportunities.
• If  the prospect opens the mail, does not click on the link and does not prevent the receipt 
of  new mails (ONF), we believe that it would gain the opportunity cost of  knowing the 
discount, whether or not to use it in the future.
• If  the prospect opens the mail and clicks on the link (OGW), we consider that you would 
gain the opportunity cost of  knowing the discount, in addition to visiting the website and 
could make a purchase by taking advantage of  this discount.
• If  the prospective client does not open the mail, does not click the link and does not allow the 
receipt of  new mails (NOS), you will lose the opportunity cost of  knowing the discounts forever.
In this way the payment function to J2 player, when the company offers a discount, could be:
U2 (OD,NOW) = 0
U2 (OD,ONF) = 1
U2 (OD,OGW) = 1
U2 (OD,NOS) = -1
If  the mail does not offer a discount, the U2 function of  payments to player J2 must take into 
account that:
• Regardless of  whether the prospective customer does not open the mail, or if  he or she 
opens it, he or she does not give up receiving new emails (NOW, ONF, OGW), he or she 
11
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does not lose or gain the opportunity cost of  obtaining an immediate discount and he or she 
does open the doors to the possibility of  future discounts in subsequent e-mails.
• If  the customer opens the mail and gives up receiving new mail (NOS), he or she lose the 
opportunity to receive further discounts.
The G2 player payments feature when the company does not offer discounts could be:
U2 (ND,NOW) = 0
U2 (ND,ONF) = 0
U2 (ND,OGW) = 0
U2 (ND,NOS) = -1
Under the assumptions described in Table 4 we can complete the matrix of  the two-
dimensional game by adding the payments to the second player and we will obtain the final 
matrix of  payments (Table 5).
Table 5
Final matrix of payments
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0 ,0) (0’175,1) (0’3,1) (-0’.1 -1)
(ND) (0 ,0) (0’167,0) (0’3,0) (-0’167,-1)
3.5. Sample and Questionnaire
The data were collected through a questionnaire that was constructed by a group of  
university students that allowed for assessing and modifying questions that were not 
understood or biased. The questionnaire was finalized and distributed online, whose 
population filter was only that they could do it (People who had a personal e-mail and 
received communications from brands or companies with whom they maintained continuous 
relationships of  purchase). The survey was carried out in two countries: Colombia and Spain, 
since they are countries that show great differences in the development of  electronic 
commerce (Sánchez-Torres & Arroyo-Cañada, 2016). Since each population will be analyzed, 
a statistical sampling was not taken into account. Finally, data were collected for 97 men and 
121 women living in Colombia and 105 men and 77 women living in Spain, for a total sample 
of  400 valid records. 
3.6. Game Development and Analysis
The answers were grouped by taking the statistical mean to generate the values  of  each 
action, for each of  the questions about the attitude they would take after receiving emails, to 
each of  the e-mails (the one that promotes the sale offering discount and the other that is 
about communication of  the brand without offering discounts).
Remember that the possible actions by the recipient of  the email are: Do not open the mail 
(NOW), open the email, do not click the link and do not unsubscribe the reception of  new 
mails (ONF), open the mail and click the link (OGW) and finally, do not open the mail, do 
not click the link and unsubscribe the receipt of  new emails (NOS).
The analysis  
has been based 
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The analysis has been based on the study of  non-cooperative and simultaneous games, the 
combinations that give rise to Nash equilibrium are not those that maximize the utility of  both 
players, but are those strategic combinations in which neither player has the incentive to 
unilaterally change his or her choice (Julmi, 2012).
4. Results
Overall, in all situations, the strategy to not open the e-mail, to not click the link and mark as 
spam by player G2 (client) is strictly dominated by any of  the other strategies of  the same 
player G2. In addition, Player G1 (company) does not have strictly dominant strategies. This 
result means in general terms the effectiveness of  direct marketing via e-mail, that for this 
study, the general customers will prefer to do any action before they mark as spam 
(unsubscribe) the mails that send their favorite brands.
4.1. Product Analysis Clothing – Men – Countries 
The first table applies the theory of  games exposed in the survey conducted to the 97 men 
living in Colombia to which clothing has been promoted (Table 6).
Table 6
Matrix game theory (Colombian men – clothing)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’227,1) (0’299,1) (-0’062,-1)
(ND) (0 ,0) (0’124,0) (0’38.10) (-0’124,-1)
Nash equilibrium is obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NOW) and (ND, 
OGW).
The second table corresponds to a situation analogous to table 6, promoting men’s clothing but 
among those from Spain (Table 7).
Table 7
Matrix game theory (Spain men – clothing)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’152,1) (0’362,1) (-0’048,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’033,0) (0’2,0) (-0’114,-1)
Nash equilibrium is obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NOW) and (OD, 
OGW). Regarding the analysis focused on direct communication with the client for the case of  
companies that sell apparel, men behaved in the same way when they received an email with 
promotional contents. In both cases, a Nash equilibrium was found when the strategic action 
of  the client was to open the content of  the email and know its content. However, in 
When the play  
is to send direct 
communication 
of  promotions, 
Nash 
equilibrium  
for male clients 
in Colombia, 
while in Spain, 
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Colombia, male customers did not carry out more actions in general, while in Spain, another 
equilibrium is presented, having to read the information, finish visiting the website and perhaps 
buying with that offer is another of  the resulting possibilities.
Regarding direct communication of  the brand without discount information, for both 
countries, a Nash equilibrium occurred when customers did not open such e-mails, although in 
Colombia there is also this equilibrium, another, where they also open the message and also 
visit the web page, being more interesting for both parties this result.
4.2. Electronic Products and Music Analysis – Men – Countries
The next matrix shows the game that is deduced from the survey of  men living in Colombia 
receiving e-mails about electronic items (Table 8).
Table 8
Matrix game theory (Colombian men – electronic products)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’227,1) (0’309,1) (-0’04.1-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’134,0) (0’402,0) (-0’082,-1)
Nash equilibrium was obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NAM) and 
(ND, OGW).
The next matrix represents the game obtained from men living in Spain receiving e-mails about 
electronic items (Table 9).
Table 9
Matrix game theory (Spain men – electronic products)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’129,1) (0’448,1) (-0’076,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’014,0) (0’4,0) (-0.048,-1)
Nash equilibrium was obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NOW) and 
(OD, OGW).
Regarding what happens in the game between company and clients male, when e-mail is about 
electronic products and music, when the play is to send direct communication of  promotions, 
Nash equilibrium for male clients in Colombia, comes when these open the email and read the 
information, while in Spain, in addition to this “equilibrium game”, also presents another, 
when in addition to opening and reading the e-mail, continue and visit the web.
For the case of  direct communications on information without promotions, the same 
“equilibriums games” are repeated as in the case of  the clothing product, the equilibrium is 
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found when the company sends this type of  communication and the action of  the clients for 
both countries is not open the email, except in Colombia where there is also another 
equilibrium, when in addition to opening it, they visit the web.
4.3. Product Analysis Clothing – Women – Countries
The next table represents the game obtained from the survey of  Colombian women receiving 
e-mails about clothing (Table 10).
Table 10
Matrix game theory (Colombian women – clothing)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’248,1) (0’347,1) (-0’025,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’095,0) (.0’529,0) (-0’058,-1)
Nash equilibrium was obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NOW) and 
(ND, OGW).
The next matrix represents the game that obtained from the survey in which women living in 
Spain received e-mails about clothing (Table 11).
Table 11
Matrix game theory (Spain women – clothing)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’273,1) (0’273,1) (-0’078,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’07.10) (0’429,0) (-0’13,-1)
Nash equilibrium was obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NOW) and 
(ND, OGW).
The analysis of  equilibriums with the clothing product for the female group, present in the 
first place, that when the company sends a direct communication with promotions via e-mail, 
Nash equilibrium has been the same in both countries, having as equilibriums, that When 
receiving email with offers, women open and read the information, even if  they do not visit 
the website.
Second, the Nash equilibrium when the company sends e-mails with information without 
discounts, for the two countries there were also not differences between women by country, the 
equilibrium is found when women do not open the mail and another when They open it and 
visit the web.
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4.4. Electronic Products and Music Analysis – Women – Countries
The next matrix represents the game obtained from the survey of  women in Colombia 
receiving e-mails about electronic products (Table 12).
Table 12
Matrix game theory (Colombian women – electronic products)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’202,1) (0’413,1) (-0’05,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’136,0) (0’405,0) (-0’083,-1)
Nash equilibrium was obtained in the strategic combinations (OD, ONF), (ND, NAM) and 
(OD, OGW).
The final matrix represents the game obtained from the survey in which women in Spain 
received e-mails about electronic items (Table 13).
Table 13
Matrix game theory (Spain women – electronic products)
G1
G2
NOW ONF OGW NOS
(OD) (0,0) (0’143,1) (0’182,1) (-0’221,-1)
(ND) (0,0) (0’071,0) (0’182,0) (-0’299,-1)
In the case of  electronic and music products, Nash equilibrium for companies’ actions when 
they send discounted communications to women for the two countries, are generated when 
clients receive the e-mail, open it and read it And also appears when they open, read the e-mail 
and visit the website.
When it comes (e-mail) to only information without a promotional campaign by the company, 
for both countries, the “equilibrium game” happens when women do not open the e-mail, 
although in Spain there is another “equilibrium game”, when women open the e-mail, read the 
information and go to the website.
5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research
The objectives of  this study were to: 1) analyze the immediate effect of  the actions of  
personalized e-mailing on the behavior of  the electronic consumer, for two products with 
different characteristics (clothing/textiles and electronics/mobile telephony products); 2) offer 
a differentiated analysis of  promotional and differential e-mailing with the purpose of  
determining which of  the two is more effective in achieving the objectives of  digital marketing 
16
Harvard Deusto Business Research. Volume VII. Issue 1. Pages 2-18. ISSN: 2254-6235
Harvard Deusto Business Research
 
What Kind of E-Mail Information Is More Effective in Communicating with the Client? Application of Game...
(visit to the website, acceptance of  the information and use); and 3) establish which of  the two 
e-mails encourages the achievement of  short-term commercial objectives.
We conducted an empirical study and collected data from two countries with pronounced 
differences in the development of  e-commerce (Sánchez-Torres & Arroyo-Cañada, 2016). 
Spain has a greatly developed commercial channel, while Colombia has begun a very slow 
process of  growth in e-commerce. In addition, we analyzed the data for men and women 
separately, since previous studies of  e-commerce show differences in attitudes and behaviors 
on the Internet (Chan, Cheung, Shi, & Lee, 2015; San Martín & Jiménez, 2011).
First, Nash’s game theory was applied to the two products selected (clothing and electronic 
products), for all groups analyzed (countries and genders), the use of  campaigns Of  e-mail by 
the companies, will be received by its clients in a positive way, understood as in the worst case, 
clients will not read the e-mail but, the results indicate that they will not send these 
communications to the Spam what, it is assumed as the acceptance of  the client to continue 
receiving this type of  direct communication. This result is in line with previous studies on the 
effectiveness of  e-mailing as a means of  direct communication with customers.
For the second objective, this study failed to determine substantial differences between the 
effectiveness of  promotional e-mailing and differential e-mailing, since in some cases clients did 
not read the e-mail with discounts and may read the emails alone Contain differential 
communication, in other cases, clients read the promotional communications and end up visiting 
the web, and the opposite happens with the differential communication e-mail, being unread.
The third objective, related to the efficiency of  the two types of  e-mails in improving the 
achievement of  short-term commercial objectives (i.e., increasing sales), was measured with the 
equilibriums where it was met that customers ended up visiting the page Web after reading the 
e-mail, the results do not allow to establish what type of  direct communication is more 
effective since, as in the previous point, this happened for the two types of  direct 
communication.
Finally the differences depending on the control variables that were established, resulted in the 
most important ones that by gender, for the product clothes and garments, generate the 
equilibrium of  the game and therefore tend to be the common action, open the e- Mail and 
finish the commercial funnel by visiting the web, while in men the general “equilibrium of  
game” is simply read said e-mail. In this case, it is clear that clothing can be a product of  
greater interest for women than for men, which should be taken into account for this type of  
industry.
Another interesting difference was found for the electronic product - mobile telephony, the 
opposite happens, the “equilibriums of  the games” are established when the men open 
promotional emails and also when they visit the web; While for women only happens when 
they open and read the information but do not go to the site, for this, is better for companies 
to send this type of  products to this type of  communication to their male clients, since it will 
have better effectiveness in their Short-term sales target for example.
Regarding differences by country, a trend is clearly seen for men in each country, Spanish men 
tend to generate the “equilibrium of  the game” for promotional e-mail, when they open such 
communications and go to the page web achieving the company its objectives with the action, 
whereas the Colombian men in this case generate “equilibrium of  the game” only reading the 
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for Colombia. This may be due to the development of  e-commerce in Spain, where the 
purchase of  products such as clothing via the internet is massive, in contrast to the Colombian 
case where despite the development of  digital sales portals, society still does not trust this 
channel. In the case of  women, there are no substantial differences.
This study presents major limitations because, first, it is one of  the first approaches to use 
game theory to decipher consumer behavior in relation to business marketing actions. 
Therefore, the methodology of  the game may entail different interpretations or discrepancies 
in the method, as much mathematical as of  the classic marketing. Future research should use 
the game theory to analyze the actions and final decisions of  two players clearly identified in a 
commercial relationship, on the one hand the company and on the other the client.
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